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I
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of Japan, which became effective on May 3, 1947,
drastically reformed the Japanese judicial system.' For the first time in the
history of Japan, its constitution recognized the principle of separation of
powers between the various branches of government. The 1947 Constitution
conferred legislative powers on the Diet, placed executive power in the
Cabinet, and granted judicial power to the Supreme Court and those inferior
courts created by law. The new Constitution gave, also for the first time,
exclusive jurisdiction over all legal disputes to the judicial system and
empowered the courts to determine the constitutionality of any law, order,
regulation, or official government act.
This article examines the role of the Japanese judiciary and its status
within Japan's parliamentary system. The article begins with a review of the
history of the Japanese judicial system. It then examines the organization of
Japan's courts and their respective jurisdictions. Next, its focus shifts to
Japan's judges and the process of judicial selection. Finally, the article
discusses judicial appointment and its effect on judicial independence. The
relationship between appointment and independence is very important
because the power of reappointment places certain limitations on judicial
independence in Japan.
II
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM BEFORE THE 1947 CONSTITUTION
Until 1868, Japan was a feudal system governed by the Tokugawa
Shogunate. The emperor was a powerless monarch. The Shogunate
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administered a legal system founded on the codification of customary laws,
which emphasized consciousness of social status.2 There was no distinct line
between administrative and judicial functions. Confucianism was adopted as
the official ideology and provided moral ideals on which the hierarchical social
relationships ofJapanese feudalism were founded. Customary law supported
the existing social order and legislation normally took the form of
administrative directives, regulations, or proclamations that dealt with matters
concerning the support of feudal regimes. Japanese laws, for the most part,
were a means of constraint or enforcement used by government authorities to
achieve government purposes and to maintain a strict code of social behavior
and relationships among Japanese people.3 A limited judicial system for
dispute resolution between private parties existed, but the rights of
individuals were not well respected, and people were expected to obey.4
The Shogun was the military leader of Japan and delegated all power to
lower feudal lords or administrative entities. For example, "the shogun
delegated to the senior council (rojo), which delegated to the finance
commission (kanjo bugyo), which delegated to the deputy (daikan), who
looked to the village headman (nanushi), who looked to the chief of the five-
man group (gonin-gumi kashira), who looked to the househead, who
controlled the family members." 5 To criticize or challenge one's superiors in
this chain of command was a serious breach of loyalty and piety. One had no
legal right to challenge the authority of one's superiors in a court of law.
Courts were not clearly distinguished from administrative offices, and these
offices could not accept a petition by a Confucian inferior against a superior
without the superior's permission. 6
In 1868, the Meiji Restoration returned the emperor to power, abolished
the shogunate, and eventually resulted in modernization of the legal system.
The new structure of the government included a powerful executive
supported by a strong bureaucracy, a weak legislature, and a developing
judiciary. 7 In 1871, all civil and criminal cases were placed under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (Shihosho), which organized a national
judicial system. 8 The highest court (Daishin-in) was officially established in
1875 and modeled on the highest judicial court in France (Cour de
cassation).9 Under the Imperial Japanese (Meiji) Constitution of 1889,Japan
adopted a monarchy as its system of government. The Meiji Constitution was
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patterned after the Prussian constitution and based on the concept of
emperor sovereignty.' 0 Although the Constitution allocated legislative power
to the Diet, administrative power to the Cabinet, and judicial power to the
courts, the three powers were simply aspects of imperial sovereignty. They
did not involve true separation of powers, with its implied checks and
balances.
Under the Meiji Constitution, the emperor held sovereign power, and the
Courts, Diet, and Cabinet exercised their power in the name of the emperor.
The Diet had the power to enact laws; Cabinet ministers, acting for the
emperor, could also issue rules and regulations that had the force and effect
of laws. The judicial system established by the Court Organization Law
(Saibansho) of 1890 was modeled on the French and German judicial systems.
Those systems limited the jurisdiction of judicial courts to civil and criminal
matters involving private parties and assigned jurisdiction for administrative
cases to separate administrative courts.I The judiciary was part of the
Ministry of Justice and was organized into four levels: the Grand Court of
Judicature (Daishin-in), the court of appeals (kosoin), the district courts
(chih6 saibansho), and the ward courts (ku saibansho). Ward courts were the
courts of first instance over small claims and had "exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy, land registration, and noncontentious matters related to family
law and succession."' 2 They were the only courts over which a single judge
presided. The district courts were courts of first-instance, general original
jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction from the ward courts. The courts of
appeal were intermediate appellate courts for the district courts. The
procedure in the courts of appeal was to retry cases on appeal for an error in
law or factfinding. The highest appellate court, the Grand Court of the
Judicature, heard appeals from the courts of appeal and, in cases of very great
importance, appeals directly from the district courts. Judges were selected for
appellate courts from the lower courts. Decisions were always given by the
whole court; no dissenting opinions were announced or published. 13
The judiciary was under the general supervision of the Ministry of Justice.
Although judges were supposedly independent from the Ministry in the
exercise of their judicial power, the judiciary was organizationally dependent
on it. The Ministry of Justice controlled all budgetary and administrative
matters of the judiciary, including the appointment, promotion, transfer,
supervision, and dismissal of judges and court officials. The Meiji
Constitution of 1889 did not provide for judicial independence and
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specifically stated that "U]udicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law
according to law, in the name of the Emperor."' 14 The judiciary had no power
to review the constitutionality of legislation passed by the Diet and was bound
by all laws. The concept of absolute imperial sovereignty meant that there
was no such thing as an unconstitutional law.
Administrative acts of government were beyond judicial review. Judicial
courts could not try cases involving a dispute between private citizens and
administrative authorities of government. 15 In most instances, a private
citizen's complaint against a government official or agency required
submission to the supervising government office for corrective action of a
voluntary nature. Special courts, including an administrative court (gy6sei
saibansho) and a military court, were established in the executive branch of
government and had limited jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain
administrative actions of government. The administrative court had
jurisdiction only over appeals specifically permitted by statute or order. 6
The courts were quasi-judicial administrative agencies, in which retired
government officials served as judges. 17  These courts had different
procedural rules from ordinary courts, and no appeal could be taken from
their decisions.
The authors of the Meiji Constitution did not envision the Japanese
judiciary as a strong independent force in governmental decisionmaking. The
judiciary had no power or authority to review actions by the executive or
legislative branches of the government. A strong motive for the initial
establishment of the judiciary was to persuade Western foreign powers to
renegotiate their very favorable and unequal treaties with Japan and especially
to abandon extraterritorial privileges established by those treaties.' 8 Japan
restructured its legal system as part of its program to modernize its society
and thus to participate on equal terms in the international economic
marketplace and political arena.
Between 1870 and 1900, Japan made tremendous strides in modernizing
its legal system. TheJapanese followed the European models, particularly the
French and German. However, Japanese society as a whole had no knowledge
of the new European concepts of rights and duties. European legal codes
were predicated on a "society in which every individual is presumed free and
14. MEIJI CONST. art. 57; Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 20.
15. MEIJI CONST. art. 61.
16. MEIJI CONST. art. 61; D. HENDERSON & J. HALEY, supra note 11, at 254.
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Tokugawa officials, the treaties thatJapan signed with Western nations were extremely prejudicial to
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subsequent revision of these disadvantageous treaties. H. TANAKA, supra note 4.
One treaty provision negotiated by the Tokugawa Shogunate stands out as particularly
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equal with everyone else ... and where loyal relationships are created by the
exercise of an individual's free will."19 The new Japanese legal system was
not meant to interfere with or to alter the morality of the Japanese people.
"Even the most progressive [Japanese] intellectuals toward the end of the
Edo period expressed this idea, and their motto was 'western techniques,
Oriental morality.' "20 This philosophy as put into practice was described by
Professor Yosiyuki Noda as follows:
Although Japan succeeded in faithfully imitating the French and German legal
(including judicial) systems, its own culture could not help but give an original
character to the system that was received. The rapid Europeanization was limited to
the field of state law, which dealt with only a small section of Japanese society.
Further, it must not be forgotten that the modernized law was put into operation by
men (including judges) whose outlook was determined by a peculiar set of
geographical and historical factors .... For though the law can be changed from one
day to the next, the men to whom it is applied and those (including judges) who have
to apply it in the future cannot be changed that way! Japan was destined to remain a
long time subject to social rules that were quite foreign to the received law. 2 1
Like any other position in the Japanese government bureaucracy under the
old system, judgeships were career jobs. Judges were paid the same salary as
other career bureaucrats of the same rank. Judges, like public prosecutors
and lawyers, were recruited through a national examination. Through 1936,
persons passing the examination could enter private practice immediately
without any further training. Candidates for judges and public prosecutors
spent an additional eighteen months in training as judicial apprentices. At the
end of this supplemental training period, a second examination determined
whether these candidates became judges or public prosecutors. 22 After 1936,
an eighteen-month apprenticeship was made mandatory for all persons
seeking admission to the private-practice bar. 23
Newly selected judges received further on the job training as the junior
members of collegial courts. Judges could expect gradual promotion to
higher courts. Some judges were transferred to administrative positions in
the Ministry of Justice, where they served as bureaucrats supervising the
judicial system or preparing legislation for the Diet. After several years of
service as bureaucrats, these judges were usually transferred back to the
courts .24
Public prosecutors were also considered officers of the court. Their role
was modeled after the French legal system's procurator (procureur). They
were guardians of the social order and the public good. "Procurators not
19. Y. NODA, supra note 3, at 58.
20. Id. at 60.
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expressed doubt cast on the wisdom of solving disputes about domestic relations by way of formal
adjudication in courts." H. TANAKA, supra note 4, at 455.
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23. Id. at 22.
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